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Clients Should H~ive No Interest in
IOLTA Programs: An Analysis of
the Supreme Court's Decision in
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
BY EMILY HOOD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

(

nJune 15, 1998, the Supreme Court dealt Interest on Lawyer

Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") a staggering blow In Phillips v.
WashingtonLegalFoundation,'the Court was presented with
the following issue: Do IOLTA programs "take" client property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment? The Court held that "[i]nterest income generated
by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the 'private property' of the owner of
the principal."2 In essence, the Court applied an "interest follows principal"
analysis and determined that the interest generated by client funds held by
lawyers in IOLTA accounts is a "property interest" of the client whose
funds were used to generate the interest. However, the Court was not faced
with, and declined to decide, the ultimate question-whether the interest
had been "taken" by the state in violation of the Fifth Amendment.3
Tis Note analyzes both IOLTA precedent and the Supreme Court's
decision in Phillipsv. Washington Legal Foundation.Part I of the Note
explains the history and mechanics of IOLTA programs.4 A brief overview
of the requirements of a Takings Clause claim and the Supreme Court's
previous interpretations of the Clause is presented in Part In.5 Part IV
summarizes the First, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits' holdings in previous

J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky
'Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
2Id.at 1934.
' See id.
4 See nfra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
SSee infra notes 30-58 and accompanying text.
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IOLTA challenges.6 An analysis of the Supreme Court's decision m
Phillipsv. Washington LegalFoundation,including the rationales of both
the majority and dissenting Justices, is set forth in Part V 7 Part VI of the
Note further analyzes the Phillipsdecision and concludes that the interest
generated by IOLTA programs is neither a "property interest" of the client
nor a "taking" of the client's property 8 The Note closes by assessing the
impact of the Court's decision in Phillips upon the future of American
IOLTA programs. 9 It concludes the Court incorrectly held that IOLTA
funds are a "property interest" of the client for purposes of a Fifth
Amendment takings claim and that IOLTA programs do not represent a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
I.

HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF IOLTA PROGRAMS

A. History ofIOLTA Programs
Attorneys must hold client funds in trust accounts under many different
circumstances. Filing fees, real estate closing costs, and personal injury
settlement drafts, for example, all require the attorney to hold funds m trust
for the client. Before 1980, the treatment of interest on such lawyer trust
accounts was a simple business practice. Funds placed in a trust account
with an attorney were required to be available to the client on demand.' 0
Therefore, the lawyer routinely deposited the funds in a non-interest
bearing demand account. This practice changed, however, with the passage
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980,1' which createdNegotiable Order ofWithdrawal ("NOW") accounts.
NOW accounts allowed select client funds to be both available on demand
and interest bearing. A separate NOW account was justified for clients
whose money was left in trust for a long period of time or whose account

6 See

infra notes 59-118 and accompanying text.
'See mnfra notes 119-77 and accompanying text.
8See infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
9See nfra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
'o See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1998); MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1969) (cited m Betsy B.

Johnson, Comment, 'With Liberty andJusticeforAll'IOLTA in Texas-The Texas
EqualAccess to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. Rv 725, 726 (1985)).
" Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (1994)).
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balance was large. However, for clients whose deposits were small or short
because the bank's service charges
term, NOW accounts were notjustified
2
earned.1
interest
would exceed the
The inspiration for IOLTA accounts arose from the fact that lawyers
continued to put client funds that did not justify an individual NOW
account into pooled, non-interest bearing demand deposit accounts. 3 The
developers of IOLTA programs sought to create pooled accounts of client
funds that would earn net interest for pro bono legal programs (in those
situations where client trust fund accounts could not earn net interest for
the client whose funds generated the interest). IOLTA founders "wanted to
shift the benefit of the implicit interest generated from such pooled
accounts from depository institutions to legal aid organizations."' 4
IOLTA programs were not a completely novel idea. Prior to their
appearance m the United States, similar programs had already been used
in other countries to support legal aid for the poor."5 When NOW accounts
were authorized in 1980, it appeared as if the United States could benefit
from the advantages of IOLTA programs. However, there remained one
prohibit[ed] the holding of
obstacle since "federal banking regulations
interest-bearing checking accounts by for-profit businesses such as law
firms."' 6 The barrier was removed when, in a private letter ruling, the
Federal Reserve Board's General Counsel concluded that IOLTA funds
could be deposited in NOW accounts if the funds were held in 7trust and a
charitable organization had the exclusive right to the interest.'
Thereafter, Florida became the first state to implement an IOLTA
program.18 By the time of the Phillips decision, a total of forty-nine states
W Frank Newton & James W Paulsen, ConstitutionalChallengesto
IOLTA Revisited, 101 DICK. L. REV 549,555 (1997).
" See Kevin H. Douglas, Note, IOLTAS Unmasked: Legal Aid Programs'
Funding Results in Talang of Clients' Property, 50 VAND. L. REv 1297, 1301
(1997).
2 See

14Id.

" See Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation: Is There an Iota of Property Interest in
IOLTA?, 42 VILL. L. REV 189, 196 (1997).
16Id.at 197
7 See Letter from Michael Bradfield, General Counsel, Federal Reserve System, to Donald M. Middlebrooks (Oct. 15, 1981), reprinted in Donald M.
Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program: Mechanics of its
Operation,56 FLA. B.J. 115, 117 (1982).
" See Kenneth P Kreider, Note, Florida'sIOLTA ProgramDoes Not "Take"
ClientPropertyfor Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Flonda, 57 U. CIN. L. REV
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and the District of Columbia had adopted IOLTA programs.' 9 Since their
implementation, the programs have provided extensive funding to legal
services for the poor. It has been observed that:
IOLTA programs have become an integral component of state bar
strategies to improve the availability ofbasic legal services to low-income
citizens. Nationwide, the programs currently generate about $100 million
a year, second only to federal Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") grants
as a source of funding for legal services to low-income Americans.
IOLTA funds help provide basic legal services to some 1,700,000
Americans in a given year.20
B. MechanicsofIOLTA Programs
With the advent of the NOW account, attorneys found that the funds
they held in trust for their clients fell into two distinct categories. First,
there were those client trust fund accounts that were large enough or were
held for a sufficiently long period of time to justify the cost of the NOW
account charges. Funds falling into this category should be placed in an
individual interest bearing NOW account for the client.
Alternatively, there were client trust fund accounts that were too small
in amount or so short-term that the administrative charges of the financial
institution would exceed the possible interest to be earned. 2' Attorneys
involved m IOLTA programs must make a "good faith judgment ' as to
the proper category into which each of their client's trust funds fall. If the
attorney decides that the client funds could "productively earn interest for
the client, '' 3they are unsuitable for an IOLTA account. Funds falling into
this category should be placed in an individual interest bearing NOW
account for the client. On the other hand, if the attorney concludes that the
client's funds are "nominal in amount or held only for a short period of
time,"24 such that the funds would be incapable of earning interest
profitably for the client in an individual NOW account, the attorney may
place the client's funds in a pooled IOLTA account.
369, 372 (1988).
'9 See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1927-28 (1998).
20Newton & Paulsen, supra note 12, at 550 (footnotes omitted).
21 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
2 Douglas, supra note 13, at 1302.
z
Newton & Paulsen, supra note 12, at 555.
24 Id.
at 555-56.
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IOLTA programs apply the principle of "economies of scale" in that
of client deposits that could not
they "permit[ ] the combination
individually earn interest because the costs of administration would exceed
the interest generated. Ths larger fund can be administered profitably as
a unit, although administrative or service costs would render the account
' The only funds that can be validly deposited
unprofitable if subdivided."2
into an IOLTA account are those funds that, if deposited in an individual
interest bearing NOW account, "could not be reasonably be expected to
earn interest for the client."2' 6 Furthermore, "f[n makingthis determination,
the attorney is directed to consider the practicalities of the situation,
including the 'cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service
charges, accounting costs and tax reporting costs.' "27 The IOLTA account
is able to accumulate net interest whereas individual accounts for each
client, saddled with the necessary expenses of their creation, could not.28
By pooling client funds that would individually be incapable of earning
interest, IOLTA "creates" aggregate interest that would not have existed
were it not for the special protections of the IOLTA program.
The newly created interest is entirely a product of the IOLTA
provisions. Under no circumstances could the individual client have earned
net interest on his trust account for, by definition, if he could have earned
such interest his attorney would never have placed the trust funds in an
IOLTA account. The IOLTA program thus allows for consolidation of the
unprofitable funds to generate net interest. The interest generated is
allowable under federal banking laws because charitableorganizations
have the exclusive right to the interest.29 Thus, the regulations that allow
IOLTA to create net interest effectively shift the benefit from financial
institutions to IOLTA programs.
]I.

ELEMENTS OF A TAKINGS CLAUSE CLAIM

A. ConstitutionalRequirements Under the Talangs Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States promises
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-

2'Id. at 553.
26 Id. at

555-56.
Id. at 556 (quoting TEXAS RULES OF COURT Rule 6 (West 1997)).
2 See Douglas, supranote 13, at 1302.
29 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27
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tion." ° Generally, to prove that a taking has occurred four elements must
be shown.
First, the object must be a "property interest." 31 Second, the court must
determine whether a"taking" of the property interest has occurred. 32 Third,
the court must ask whether the taking was for a "public use. '33 The
Supreme Court has defined "public use" broadly, so that this element is
3
almost always satisfied".
All that is required to find that a taking is for
public use is to find that it is "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose."3' Because the Court generally defers to state or congressional
action, it usually finds the test to be met. Finally, the court must inquire
whether "just compensation" has been paid. 6 The determination of this
issue is gauged by the loss to the owner of the property mterest.37 The
Takings Clause, therefore, is invoked only when all four elements of the
claim are satisfied.
B. The Supreme Court'sAnalysis of the Talangs Clause
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit GuarantyCorp.,38 the Supreme Court
upheld federal legislation that required an employer to pay a portion of a
pension plan's unfunded vested benefits when an employee withdrew from
the plan. The Court held that the laws were simply economic regulations
in the public interest and recognized that many types of economic
regulations cause one group of people or businesses to benefit at the
expense of another.3 9 In holding that reasonable economic regulation was
not a taking of property, the Court thus commanded the takings analysis "to
assess both the nature and importance of the governmental interest and the

30 U.S. CONST. amend. V
3' The Supreme Court has

looked to state law to determine whether the object
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw"
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 505 (1997).
32
See id. at 504.
33
Id. at 505.
34 See id.
3 See id. (citing Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 465 U.S. 1097 (1984)).

is a "property interest." See ERWIN

3 See

id.

37.1d.

31 Connolly
39

v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
See Id. at 225.
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nature and extent of the economic loss of the individual property owner or
class of property owners."
In determining whether a taking had occurred in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, the Connolly Court relied upon Penn CentralTransportation
Co. v. City ofNew York. 4' Generally, Penn Centralis acknowledged as a
good summary of the legal analysis for a claim brought under the Takings
Clause.42 In that case, a zoning law designed to protect the historical
landmarks of New York City prevented Penn Central from building an
office tower above its existing terminal. The owner of the terminal brought
suit against the City for designating the terminal as a historic landmark and
thereby prohibiting construction. He claimed a taking of the property had
occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
The Supreme Court ruled that the restriction on building over the site
of the terminal was not a taking.4 The Court's opinion established several
important elements ofthe modem Takings Clause analysis. First, the Court
noted that to recover under a takings claim, the plaintiff must establish the
presence of a recogmzed property interest before any further consideration
of the claim may be addressed. 45 Additionally, the Court established a
three-factor test for analyzing the takings claim: (1) the economic impact
of the regulation on the plaintiff; (2) the extent to which the regulation
hampers distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of
the government action." The Court went on the say that "[a] 'taking' may
more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government
than when the
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
'
burdens of economic life to promote the common good."47
More pertinent to the claims that IOLTA programs take client property
is Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith. 48 In Webb's, the
40

JoHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 440 n.9

(5th ed. 1995).
"'42Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962,
973-74 (lst Cir. 1993) (looking to Penn Centralas a summary of "takings" law and
listing its factors); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002, 1005 (11th Cir.)
(citing
Penn Centralin the IOLTA context), cert. denied,484 U.S. 917 (1987).
43
See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104.
" See id. at 138.
4s See id. at 124-25.
41 See id. at 124.
47 Id. (citing United States v Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
48 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
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Supreme Court utilized the Penn Centralfactors to analyze the plaintiff's
IOLTA claim. In that case, a Florida statute provided that all interest
earned on public or private money deposited with a county circuit court
registry became the property of the clerk. Moreover, the statute went on to
provide that "[a]ll interest accruing from moneys deposited
shall be
deemed income of the office of the clerk. '49 The plaintiffs mterpleaded
$1,812,145.77 into the Florida court registry for a dispute overthe purchase
of Eckerd's pharmacy 50 At the time the conflict was resolved between the
two pharmacies, the receiver for Webb's requested the principal and
interest from the court clerk.5 ' The clerk remitted the principal but refused
to give the receiver the accumulated interest. 52 The interest earned on the
5
mterpleaded amount exceeded $100,000. 1
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute requiring retention
of the interest was constitutional.' The court reasoned that the fund was
public money and therefore the interest earned was not private property It
said the "statute [took] only what it create[d]." 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed,56 and held that the failure
to transmit the interest amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court applied an "interest follows principal" rationale and held that the
interest belonged to the plaintiffs.5s Although the Court recognized that the
denial of a beneficial use of property to individual owners may be allowed
when the government can justify the demal as promoting the general
welfare, the Court declined to so hold in this case. 5
IV

A.

PRIOR CIRCUIT COURT CHALLENGES TO IOLTA PROGRAMS

The Eleventh Circuit'sDecision in Cone v State Bar of Florida

In Cone v. State BarofFlorida,9 the plaitiff challenged the constitutionality of Florida's IOLTA program. In 1969, the plaintiff retained a law
491Id.

at 160 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.33 (West 1973)).
" See id. at 156.
s'
id. at 157-58.
52 See
See id.at 158.
53 See id.
14 See Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla.
1979), rev'd,449 U.S. 155 (1980).
551Id. at 953.
56
See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155.
57 See id. at 162-63.
58 See id. at 163.
59Cone v State Bar of Flonda, 819
F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
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firm to probate the estate of her deceased husband.' She paid the firm a
deposit of $100, which was subsequently deposited in a non-interest
bearing trust account. 61 At the end of the firm's representation of the
plaintiff, the firm neglected to return to her the $13.75 remaining in her
account. 2 The money stayed in the account until 1981, when Florida
enacted its IOLTA program. At that time the firm transferred all of its
nominal or short term trust accounts into an IOLTA account, including the
funds inadvertently retained from Cone.6 3 In 1984, the firm discovered the
error and returned the principal to the plaintiff. However, the firm
forwarded the $2.25 in interest to the Florida Bar Association under the
terms of the state's IOLTA program.'
In a class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs clanned that the Florida IOLTA
program had "taken" the interest generated by the nominal and short-term
deposits from the owners of the respective principals.6 5 The district court
found that the plaintiffs did not have a legitimate property claim to the
interest. 6 The court relied on the "interest follows principal" rationale and
stated that "interest goes with the principal, as the fruit with the tree."'67 The
court noted that this necessarily assumes a fi-uit-bearng tree and were it not
for the IOLTA "tree" the plaintiffs' principals would never have borne
fruit. 68
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court and agreed with its
application of the "fi-uit-bearing tree" analysis, stating that for a recogmzable property interest to attach to the interest earned on the principal, there
must actually be enough principal to produce mterest.69 The court
distinguished Webb's by saying that the interest earned on the interpleader
fund in Webb's was much larger in amount and held for a much longer
period of time so as to give rise to a legitimate expectation of entitlement
to the $100,000.70 In Cone, however, the Court considered the $2.25 in
interest to be such a minimal amount that there could be no legitimate
expectation of receiving the money after making accommodations for
60

See Id.at 1003.

61 See id.
62 See zd.

at 1004.
See id.
See id.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 ed. (quoting Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809)).
68 See id.
63

69 See

id. at 1002.

' See id. at 1007
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administrative costs.7 The court reiterated the statement of the lower court

that "'the crucial distinction is not the amount of interest earned, but that
the circumstances led to a legitimate expectation of interest exclusive of
administrative costs and expenses."' 72 Here, the court said the plaitiff did
not meet its burden of showing a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
$2.25. 71 Since the plaintiff's trust fund, standing alone and without the
pooling benefits of the IOLTA program, could earn no net interest, she had
no legitimate property interest that Florida could "take" through the IOLTA
program.74 The court emphasized that it was not "establishing a de mininixs
standard for Fifth Amendment takings, or due process violations,"75 but
instead it was relying upon the fact that the interest income generated by
the IOLTA account pooling process was not within the legitimate
expectations ofthe principal owners.76 The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, held
that the Florida IOLTA program withstood constitutional scrutiny and did
not "take" client property under the Fifth Amendment.77
B. The First Circuit'sDecision in Washington Legal Foundation v

Massachusetts Bar Foundation
The First Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation' relied upon the Eleventh Circuit's

decision in Cone to hold that clients do not have a constitutionally
protected interest under the Fifth Amendment in the interest generated from
IOLTA accounts.
In Massachusetts Bar Foundation, the plaintiffs alleged that the

Massachusetts IOLTAprogram violatedboththeir Fifth Amendment rights
to due process of law and to be justly compensated for government takings,
and their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.79
The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs' takings claim, saying the
plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the interest generated through

71 See

id.

72 Id.

7 See id.
4See id.
75Id.
76

77

See id.

See id.
Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (lst
Cir.791993).
See id. at 970.
78
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the IOLTA program.° The court also dismissed the First Amendment claim
on the grounds that the Massachusetts IOLTA program did not force the
plaintiffs to associate."'
The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the district court.8 2 The
circuit court noted that other courts had refused to recognize a property
right attaching to interest earned through IOLTA programs. 3 In this case,
however, the court noted that the plaintiffs sought not to prove a right to
their IOLTA interest, but rather"claim[ed] a property right to the beneficial
use oftheir deposited funds, and more specifically, the right to control and
to exclude others from the beneficial use of those funds." 4 The plaintiffs
argued that their claim to the beneficial use of their funds arose from trust
law The court dismissed this argument by reasonig that although a lawyer
owes a fiduciary duty to his clients, the mere deposit of the clients' funds
into an IOLTA account will not change the lawyer's fiduciary duty into one
of a trustee whereby the client would be able to retain his right to control
the beneficial uses of the fund. 5 The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that they had a right to exclude others from the beneficial use oftheir
IOLTA funds. 6 The plaintiffs based this "right to exclude" on real property
principles granting such a right, but the court refused to extend this
proposition to the realm of intangible property 87 The First Circuit went on
to say that even if the plaintiffs had established a property interest in the
IOLTA interest, the Massachusetts program still would not effect an
unconstitutional taking of their property under the Penn Centralfactors.8 8
The court examined whether the taking clanned by the plaintiffs
amounted to either a physical invasion of the property or a regulation
which denied the plaintiffs of all economic use of their property8 9 The
court determined that the IOLTA property in question was not a taking by
physical invasion because the IOLTA interest was intangible, not real,
property " The court also concluded that the IOLTA program did not
amount to an economic regulation that demed plaintiffs their property
8oSee id. at 971.

id.
id. at 962.
S3 id. (citing Cone v. State Bar of Flonda, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987)).
14 Id.at 973.
85 See id. at 974.
86 See id.
81 See

82See

17 See
8See

id.
id.

See id. at 974-76.
10 See id. at 975.
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rights. The court stated that since "clients would not otherwise be entitled
to the interest earned on pooled accounts,"' because the funds could not
earn net interest individually, the IOLTA program did not hinder
"investment-backed expectations." 92 Using the "bundle of property rights"
idea, the court characterized the plaintiffs' claim as "at best, a thin strand
m the commonly recognized bundle of property rights."9 3 Furthermore,
"where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate
must be viewed m its entirety " 94 Since the IOLTA program did not
interfere with the plaintiffs' ability to "possess, use, and dispose of the
principal sum deposited in IOLTA accounts,"'95 the court held the Massachusetts program did not constitute a taking.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Webb's and
distinguished the case based on the same rationale as the Cone v. State Bar
of Floridacourt. The court stated the difference as being "[t]he Webb's
claimants had property rights to accrued interest which is tangible personal
property, while plaintiffs in this case have claimed only intangible property
mterests"9 6-- the right to control and to exclude others. Additionally, the
court stated that m Webb's the plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation of
ownership to the interest earned, whereas in the present case the plaintiffs
have no such legitimate investment-backed expectations.9 7 For the
foregoing reasons, the First Circuit held that the Massachusetts IOLTA
program withstood constitutional scrutiny and that the IOLTA program did
not take the clients' property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
C. Progeny of the Supreme Court's IOLTA Holding. The Fifth Circuit's
Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation
With the precedent of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cone v. State
Bar of Florida," and the First Circuit's decision in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation," the Washington Legal
91Id.
at

976.

92Id.
93Id.

9 Id.
95 Id.

96 Id.

See id. at 975.
Cone v State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (1Ith Cir. 1987).
9 Washington Legal Found. v Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (Ist
Cir. 1993).
98
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Foundation instigated an IOLTA suit in the Fifth Circuit."° The plaintiff in
Washington Legal Foundationv. Texas EqualAccess to Justice Foundation, like the plaintiffs in the previous two circuit court IOLTA challenges,
alleged that the Texas IOLTA program infringed upon their constitutional
rights under the Fifth Amendment."' Specifically, their two challenges to
the program were as follows: (1) that the interest generated .by IOLTA
accounts constituted client property such that the state "takes" the property
when it distributes the interest from the IOLTA program, and (2) that the
IOLTA program impairs the clients' "beneficial use"' 02 oftheir property by
requiring them to contribute the interest to the IOLTA program. 0
The district court, in accord with the holdings of the Eleventh and First
Circuits, granted summary judgment for the defendants."° The court stated
its rationale as being that the plaintiffs hadno" 'reasonable expectation' of
a property interest"'0 5 in the IOLTA interest income since such interest
would never have existed but for the IOLTA program."' The court also
determined that the plaintiffs did not have a protected right to exclude
others from the beneficial use of IOLTA funds because the program did not
intrude or interfere with a real or tangible property interest. 0 7 The district
court concluded that because the plaintiffs had no legitimate property
interest in real or tangible property, the Texas IOLTA program did not
"take" client property '0'
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, and held that the clients
who owned the principal funds of the IOLTA accounts were respectively
entitledto the "property interest" ofthe accrued mterest.l°9 Citing to Texas'
"interest follows principal" rule," 0 the court rejected the district court's
reliance on the decisions of the First and Eleventh Circuits and found the
IOLTA interest to be the property of the clients."'

" See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873
F Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
10' See id.
'02Id. at5.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 8.
105 Id. at7
06 See

id.
107
id.at 8.
lO See id.
'9See Washington Legal Found. v Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94

F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996).
"0 See id at 1000.
I See id. at 1005.
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The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
decision m Webb s, reasoning that Webb's created a rule that a property
interest exists simply because "'[t]he earnings of a fund are mcidents of
ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is
property "'11 The court felt that this rule should apply regardless of the
value of the claimed amount. It criticized the Cone court's rationale that a
property interest attaches only to net interest (the interest remaining after
the bank deducts its surcharges) which would never exist for an IOLTA
claimant.' Instead, the Fifth Circuit took the position that a property
interest attaches the moment the interest is credited to the account and
therefore exists before the bank deducts its charges, making the IOLTA
n4
interest a "property mterest.""
The defendants argued that for these reasons, the interest could not
accrue to the clients. The court rejected this argument based on IRS
regulations. The court stated that the IRS regulations which made IOLTA
feasible provide that clients will not be taxed on IOLTA interest only so
long as they do not have any control over their participation in the program
or assignment ofthat interest." 5 Under the IRS regulations, if the client has
any control over the interest, it is taxable.1 6 In light of the IRS regulations,
the court reasoned that it would be illogical to conclude that the interest
generated from IOLTA principals is not the property of the principal
owners."l Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that clients do have a property
interest in the interest income produced through IOLTA accounts.
V THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
PHILLIPS v WASHINGTONLEGAL FOUNDATION

A.

Overview of the Supreme Court'sDecision

The Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington LegalFoundationv. Texas
EqualAccess to JusticeFoundationbroke with the precedent of the First
and Eleventh Circuits." 9 Although the Washington Legal Foundation lost
"2 Id. at

1002 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
,13 See id. at 1003.
114 See id.
"'6 See id. at 1003-04.
" See id. at 1003.
,, 7 See id.
..
8See id. at 1004.
..See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962
(1st Cir. 1993); Cone v State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
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on its claim m the First Circuit, it declined to appeal that decision to the
Supreme Court. Instead, the Foundation instigated another suit m which it
successfully rallied to victory in Texas to achieve its desired result-a
circuit split for IOLTAjunsprudence. Against this background, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation.'
On June 15, 1998, the Supreme Court dealt IOLTA a devastating
setback with its decision in Phillips. The Court held, m a five to four
decision, that the "interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA
accounts is the 'private property' of the owner of the principal.""'
Although the respondents claimed that the Texas IOLTA program
amounted to a "taking" of their property under the Fifth Amendment, the
Court declined to give any opinion as to whether the IOLTA funds had
been "taken" by the state or as to the amount of "just compensation" that
might be due the principal owners." The case was remanded for adjudication of those issues."'
There were two dissents in Phillips.2 4 The first, authored by Justice
Souter, argued that the case should be remanded to the district court on the
grounds that it was error for the Court to limit its inquiry to the abstract
"property interest" issue without addressing the totality of the takings
claim." Justice Breyer's dissent, while agreeing with Justice Souter and
"believ[ing] it wrong to separate Takings Clause analysis of the property
rights at stake from analysis of the alleged deprivation,"126 considered the
issue of whether IOLTA interest constituted a "property interest" and
concluded that it did not.17
B. Rationale of ChiefJusticeRehnquist's Majority Opinion
The majority m Phillips narrowly defined the issue as "whether the
interest on an IOLTA account is 'private property' of the client for whom
' In a footnote the Chief Justice stated that,
the principal is being held."128

Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
Id. at 1934.
' See id.
' See id.
124See id. at 1934-37 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 1937-39 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
"d
See d. at 1934-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26
1 Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127 See id. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 1930.
12

2
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because the petitioners did not argue in their petition for certiorari that it
was error forthe circuit court to address onlythe property interest question,
it would thus be inproper for the Court to reach the "taking" or "just
compensation" elements of the claim which were not set forth in the
petition.129 As a result, the Court limited its inquiry solely to the "property
mterest" issue.130
Pointing out that "the Constitution protects rather than creates property
mterests, 13' the Court stated that "the existence of a property interest is
determined by reference to'existing rules orunderstandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law "'132 Therefore, the Court relied
upon the "interest follows principal" rule, 33 citing to an English common
law case134 and to the Texas decision of Sellers v. Hams County 131 The
Court also relied heavily on Webb's and stated the following:
We held [in Webb's] that the statute authorizing the clerk to confiscate the
earned interest violated the Takings Clause. As we explained, "a State by
ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without
compensation" simply by legislatively abrogating the traditional rule that
"earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are
property just as the fund itself is property." In other words, at least as to
confiscatory regulations (as opposed to those regulating the use of
property), a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
36
traditional property interests long recognized under state law.'
The Court consequently refused to accept petitioners' arguments that
Texas' exceptions to the "interest follows principal" rule, which included
income-only trusts and marital community property rules, could be
extended in principle to embrace the IOLTA situation. 137 "Petitioners'
29

See id. at 1930 n.4.
See id. at 1930.
131
Id.
1321d.(quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577
(1972)).
133 See id.
See d. (quoting Beckford v. Tobin, 27 Eng. Rep. 1049, 1051 (Ch. 1749),
which states that "[I]nterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the body ").
3
' sSee id. at 1931 (quoting Sellers v. Hams County, 483 S.W.2d 242,243 (Tex.
1972) (arguing that "[t]he interest earned by deposit of money owned by the parties
to the lawsuit is an increment that accrues to that money and to its owners.")).
3
1 6 Id.(citations omitted).
17 See id. at 1931-32.
'

30
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138
the Court asserted,
examples miss the point of our decision in Webb 's,'
because in the Court's opinion the Texas exceptions noted by the petitioners were well-established in traditional property law, while an owner's
distribution of income generated by the principal is also a fundamental
principal of property law 139 Therefore, under the guise of respecting
"traditional"''O property law concepts, the Court reliedupon Webb's strictly
as an "interest follows principal" decision, anddisregarded the widespread
factual differences between the interest income generated by the principal
and the IOLTA program in the Texas
in the interpleader account in Webb 's

case.

14 1

The petitioners in Phillips also argued that since the client funds
deposited in the IOLTA program could not generate net interest, the
principal owners could not assert a property interest in the interest
income.142 The Court rejected tis claim, stating "[w]e have never held that
a physical item is not 'property' simply because it lacks a positive
economic or market value."' 43 The Court accepted the position that
"property" is more than an economic interest, but rather a "group of rights
which the so-called owner exercises in his dommion of the physical
thing,"' 44 and encompasses "the right to possess, use and dispose of it."' 4 5
Most importantly, the Court rejected the United States' amicus curiae
position that "private property" is not jeopardized by IOLTA programs
because the interest income generated is "government-created value."'"
The Court wholly discarded this contention as being "factually
erroneous."' 4 7 Contrary to the First and Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme
Court stated that:
The interest income transferred to the [Texas IOLTA program] is not the
product of increased efficiency, economies of scale, or pooling of funds

"I Id.
at 1931.
139 See id. at 1932.
140 Id.
141See id. at 1931-32 (citing and comparing the facts in Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies,Inc. v. Becklith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
142
See zd. at 1933.
143

Id.

IAId.
145
Id. (quoting United States v General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378
(1945)).
Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae,No. 96-1578, 1997
WL 528612, at *20 (Aug. 25, 1997)).
147Id.
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by the government. [T]he State does nothing to create value; the value
is created by the respondents' funds. The Federal Government, through
the structuring of its banking and taxation regulations, imposes costs on
this value ifprivate citizens attempt to exercise control over it. Waiver of
these costs if the property is remitted to the State hardly constitutes
"government-created value."' 148
The Court maintained that it had similarly rejected the above argument m
49
Webb s.1
Based on the above conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Fifth Circuit and held that "interest income generated by
funds held m IOLTA accounts is the 'private property' of the owner of the
pnncipal."'15 0
B. Rationale ofJusticeSouter's DissentingOpinion
Dissenting from the Court's ruling mPhillips,Justice Souterjomedby
Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg, maintained that by trisecting the
takings analysis and thereafter ruling as to only one portion of the claim,
the Court presented an abstract holding."' Justice Souter stated:
I do not join in today's ruling because the Court's limited enquiry has led
it to announce an essentially abstract proposition; even on the assumption
that the abstract proposition is a correct statement of law, it may ultimately turn out to have no significance in resolving the real issue raised
in this case, which is whether the Interest on Lawyers Trust Account
(IOLTA) scheme violates the Talangs Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Since the sounder course would be to vacate the similarly limited
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand for the
broader enquiry outlined below, I respectfully dissent"l
Justice Souter argued that the Court, by ruling only as to the "property
interest" component of the Takings Clause analysis, failed to recognize the
integrated nature of the elements of the claim. In fact, the petitioners'

14 8 Id

"'49 See id. (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155
(1980)).
'5 °Id. at 1934.
' See id. at 1934-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
52
Id. at 1934 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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fundamental argument rested on the totality of the takings claim. The
Petitioners claimed that there was no Fifth Amendment talang of the
respondents' property because the "respondent client would effectively be
barred from receiving any net interest on his funds subject to the state
IOLTA rule.""r The respondents would be barred from earning any net
interest from their funds placed in IOLTA accounts because of the
combined effects of an unchallengedfederal banking statute authorizing
IOLTA accounts, an unchallengedTexas rule of attorney conduct, and an
unchallengedInternal Revenue Service construction of the Tax Code. 4
Therefore, argued Justice Souter, the division of the respondents clann into
"abstract" categories and the ruling of the Court only as to one of the
categories erroneously ignored the totality of the petitioners' claim-that
the Texas IOLTA program does not "take" the clients' property 155
In support of Ins position that the Court's analysis should be an
integrated rather than segregated approach, Justice Souter reached the crux
of his argument, pointing out that "the way we may ultimately resolve the
taking and compensation issues bears on the way we ought to resolve the
property issue."' 56 He asserted:
If it should turn out that within the meanmg of the Fifth Amendment, the
IOLTA scheme had not taken the property recognized today, or if it
should turn out that the "just compensation" for any taking was zero, then
there would be no practical consequence for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment in recognizing a client's property right in the interest in the
first place; any such recognition would be an inconsequential abstraction.
Approaching the property issue in conjunction with the two others
would, in fact, be entirely faithful to the Fifth Amendment, for as we have
repeatedly said its Takings Clause does nothing to bar the government
from taking property, but only from taking it without just compensa57

tion. 1

Accordingly, because the Fifth Circuit did not address either the taking or
compensation elements, Justice Souter's proposition is that the Court
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a); 12 C.F.R. § 204.130 (1997); Texas Bar
Rules, art. 10, § 9, Rule 1.14(b); Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16; Rev. Rul. 87-2,
1987-1 C.B. 18).
55
' See id. at 1934-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156Id. at 1935.
117 Id. (citations omitted).
1

'iSee
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should have examined whether either of those claims might have been
resolved against the respondents, and if so, then the case should have been
remanded to the Court of Appeals for adjudication of all the issues.'58
As to the "taking" issue, Justice Souter relied on Penn Central and
cited the "nature of the government's action, its economic impact, and the
degree of any interference with reasonable, investment-backed expectations"1 59 as the appropriate considerations for a Takings Clause claim.
Noting that there had been no physical invasion of property, no net
economic impact, nor any reasonable expectation of an investment or gain
of net interest, Justice Souter concluded that aside from a departure from
the Penn Centralrationale, the respondents would be unlikely to succeed
in proving that a "taking" had occurred."6
With respect to the "just compensation" element of the Takings Clause
claim, Justice Souter stated that "'j]ust compensation' generally means
'the full monetary equivalent ofthe property taken.' "161
Furthermore, "[i]n
determining the amount ofjust compensation for a taking, a court seeks to
place a claimant 'in as good a position pecuniarily as ifhis property had not
been taken.'"1 62 Therefore, to determine what would constitute just
compensation for the respondents' IOLTA claim, a court should examine
what property interest the client could have procured in the absence of the
IOLTAprogram. This analysis at best wouldproduce a discouraging result
for the respondents since by definition no client funds will ever be placed
in an IOLTA account if the attorney concludes that the funds may
independently earn interest for the client in an individual NOW account.
Given the above consideration of the taking and just compensation
elements of the respondents' IOLTA claim, Justice Souter concluded that
the judgment of the Fifth Circuit should be vacated and the case remanded
for adjudication of all elements of the Takings Clause claim.1 63
C. RationaleofJustice Breyer'sDissentingOpinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
dissented from the majority in Phillips on the ground that the interest
See id. at 1935-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1936 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of
New6 York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
' See zd. (Souter, J., dissenting).
61
1 Id.(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14,
16 (1970)).
62
1 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres Land, 441
U.S. 506 (1979)).
163 See id. at 1937 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158

1-9 Id. at
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earned on client trust funds deposited in IOLTA accounts does not amount
to a "property interest" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 64 Although
in agreement with Justice Souter that the proper result would be for the
case to be remanded for review of each of the three prongs of the takings
analysis, Justice Breyer nevertheless considered the "property interest"
question independently 165
Refernngto the Court's reliance on Webb's, Justice Breyerrejectedthe
majority's deference to the "interest follows principal" rationale. He did
not consider the case or its rationale to be applicable to the IOLTA suit. 66
Justice Breyer refused to embrace the "interest follows principal"
rationale because the circumstances under which IOLTA interest is
generated differ dramatically from the traditional situation in which the
rationale applies. In the case ofIOLTA-generated interest, by definition the
owner's principal would never have generated any net interest were it not
for the unique benefits of the IOLTA program. 67 Justice Breyer posed the
question, "[u]nder these circumstances, what is the property right of the
client that IOLTA could have 'confiscat[ed]'9" 6 8 In answering, he
reasoned:
The most that Texas law here could have taken from the client is not a
right to use his principal to create a benefit (for he had no such right), but
the client's right to keep the client's principal sterile, a right to prevent the
principal from being put to productive use by others
And whatever
this Court's cases may have said about the constitutional status of such a
right, they have not said that the Constitution forces a State to confer,
upon the owner of property that cannot produce anything of value for
him, ownership of the fruits of that property should that property be
rendered fertile through the government's lawful intervention
Thus
the question is whether "interest," earnedonly as a result ofIOLTA rules
and earned upon otherwise barrenclient principal "follows principal."169
Justice Breyer likewise rejected the Court's reliance on Webb's because of
the factual differences that separate the two cases. 70 In Webb's, the funds
deposited in the court's interpleader account could have generated the
16

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

161
See id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
.70 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'

6I Id. (Breyer,
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$100,000 of net interest in the absence of state intervention. 171 In the case
of IOLTA programs, no net interest on a client's principal would ever be
generated but for the state's action. The Webb's holding, that interest
produced from a principal which could generate net interest on its own
takes private property without just compensation," sheds little light on
who owns interest generated by a barren principal through the use of
governmental IOLTA programs.'3
Concluding that justification for the majority's holding (that interest
generated by IOLTA accounts is a "property interest" of the owner of the
principal) could be found neither in Webb's nor in the "interest follows

principal" precept, Justice Breyer turned to an analogy to justify his
position. 74 Looking to land valuation cases as an example, Justice Breyer
stated that "the value of what is taken is bounded by that which is 'lost,'
not that which the 'taker gaed.""" Therefore, it would be Impossible to
claim that the owners of the IOLTA principal funds incurred a government
"taking" when absent the governmental intrusion there would have been no
property to take.176 Consequently, Justice Breyer concludedthat the interest
earned on the funds deposited in the Texas IOLTA account
was not
177
claim.
Clause
Takings
a
of
purposes
for
property"
"private
VI. ANALYSIS

A. IOLTA Interest is Not a "PropertyInterest"

The majority in Phillipsnarrowly defined the issue as being "whether
the interest on an IOLTA account is 'private property' of the client for
whom the principal is being held."'78 In forming its answer to this question,
the Court was obligated to determine the existence or nonexistence of such
a property interest by looking to Texas state law. The majority opinion, like
the opinion ofthe Fifth Circuit, relied solely upon the Texas case of Sellers

'"

See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 158

(1980).

172 See id. at 155.
73 See Phillips,118 S. Ct. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston,
217 76U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
'

75

'
'

7

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
, See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

78
1

Id. at 1930.
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v. Hams County179 to ascertain the appropriate Texas state law to apply to
the Takings Clause claim.' However, it can be argued that the Fifth
Circuit's, and therefore the Court's, reliance on the Sellers opimon and its
"interest follows principal" rationale was erroneous:"8 '
The touchstone of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, and the only point at which
the court explicitly refers to Texas authority, is the statement that "Texas
observes the traditional rule that 'interest follows principal'
" In
support of this supposed general rule, the panel cited a 1972 Texas
Supreme Court decision, Sellers v. HarrisCounty.
[C]ontrary to the Fifth Circuit's statement, the Texas Supreme Court
in Sellers never once used the phrase "interest follows pnncipal," whether
stated as a "traditional rule" or otherwise. Moreover, while the Fifth
Circuit introduced its citation to Sellers with an "e.g." signal, implying
that other Texas cases also have espoused the "interest follows pnncipal"
rule, that implication is questionable. Judging from Texas cases in the
Westlaw and LEXIS databases, which include Texas appellate opinions
from the late 1880s on, one can say with some confidence that no Texas
court in the modem era seems ever to have used the phrase, "interest
82
follows principal," whether in a holding, as dicta, or otherwise
Even if for the purpose of argument one accepts the "interest follows
principal" rationale, the Court misapplied the rationale when it adopted the
reasoning of Webb's. The Webb's decision was based upon a fact situation
that was entirely different from the IOLTA case presented by Phillips.W
Of prime importance is the distinction between the amount of money
deposited in the interpleader account in Webb '"'84 andthe amount of money
deposited by the IOLTA claimants. 5 In the case of the Webb's funds, the

"I Sellers v. Hams County, 483 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1972).
0
,s
See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1931.
181 See Newton & Paulsen, supranote 12, at 567-72.
' Id. at 568 (footnotes omitted).
183 See supranotes 164-77 (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent in Phillipsv.
Washington Legal Found., 118 S.Ct. 1925, 1937-39 (1998)).
184See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 156-58
(1980). The lawsuit in Webb's involved another pharmacy company's purchase of
the Webb's chain for $1,812,145.77 This amount was tendered to the court during
the dispute, where it earned over $90,000.00 in interest while held by the clerk;
thereafter, the interest on this amount reached more than $100,000.00.
'sIn contrast, the sums deposited by IOLTA claimants were mmnmal amounts.
See Phillips, 118 S.Ct. at 1929.
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total amount of the deposit was sufficient to independentlyearn net interest
in its individualcapacity This is radically different from the situation of
the Phillipsproperty holders, whose money would never even have been
placed in an attorney's IOLTA account if the funds had the capability to
independently earn net interest for the client. In the second situation it is
the aggregation of individual clients' funds in the IOLTA program, not the
principals of the individual owners, that operates to earn net interest.
Webb's was a limited decision, in which the Court expressly stated that
its holding was narrow 186 By relying on the Webb's decision, the Court
inaccurately transposed an absolute "interest follows principal" analysis
that was neither present in the limited decision in Webb's nor applicable to
the unique facts of the IOLTA program.
Therefore, it was erroneous for the Supreme Court to hold that the
interest income generated by the Texas IOLTA program was a "property
interest" of the principal owners for purposes ofa Takings Clause claim. 7
The Court's reliance on the Fifth Circuit's faulty analysis of Texas property
law, 88 coupled with its misplaced dependence on the Webb's decision,
produced an "interest follows principal" rationale that was both maccurate
and inappropriate. It is impossible to claim that the owners of the IOLTA
principal funds incurred a government "taking" of a "property interest"
when absent the governmental intrusion there would have been no
"property" to take. 18 9
B. IOLTA ProgramsDo Not Cause a Fifth Amendment Talang of Client
Property
By trisecting the Takings Clause analysis and thereafter ruling only on
one portion of the claim, the Court presented an abstract holding and left
the future of IOLTA programs in a state of uncertainty The ultimate
question is whether the IOLTA scheme constitutes a "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment. In ruling only as to the "property interest" prong of the
claim, the Court did not resolve the question, but instead created even more
perplexity in this unsettled area of the law Those concerned with the
constitutional status of IOLTA programs have been presented with an
isolated holding by the country's highest Court that the interest income
generated by the programs is a "property interest."
86

See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.

18 7 See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.
188 See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas

Equal Access to Justice Found., 94

F.3d89996 (5th Cir. 1996).
1 See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Unquestionably, the Supreme Court will be forced to rule on the chief
issue, whether IOLTA programs "take" the property of the principal
owners, before the question is resolved. Although the Court held mPhillips
that the interest generated through the Texas IOLTA program was a
"property interest" ofthe client who owned the principal, this holding may
have little or no effect on the eventual resolution of the IOLTA debate.
As stated by Justice Souter m his dissenting opinion in Phillips,the
Takings Clause analysis should be an integrated analysis resting on the
totality of the "takings" claim. 9 ° He asserted that "[a]pproachmg the
property issue in conjunction with the two others would, in fact, be entirely
faithful to the Fifth Amendment, for as we have repeatedly said its Takings
Clause does nothing to bar the government from taking property, but only
'
from taking it without just compensation."191
In the case of IOLTA
programs, it is unlikely that claimants will be able to prove that a "taking"
has occurred without "just compensation" because of the nature of the
IOLTA scheme. 92
Since in the unique IOLTA context there has been no physical invasion
of property, no net economic impact, nor any interference with reasonable
expectations of an investment or gain of net interest, it is rationally
93
impossible for the principal owners to claim a "taking" has occurred.1
Additionally, the IOLTA claimants will not be able to prove the
absence of "just compensation." Because a client's funds will never be
placed in an IOLTA account if the attorney concludes that the funds have
the capacity to independently earn net interest for the client, the client
whose funds generated interest through the program cannot claim a lack of
"just compensation." This is because the principal would never have
generated interest, and the client could have expected no compensation in
the absence of the IOLTA program. Based on the integrated analysis of all
elements of a Takings Clause claim it is apparent that IOLTA programs do
not "take" client property under the Fifth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Phillips, it
rejectedthe precedent established by the First and Eleventh Circuits. More
9oSee id.at 1935 (Souter, J., dissenting).
I9
d. (Sourer, J., dissenting).
192 See supra notes 21-29 (discussing the minimal sums deposited in IOLTA
accounts).
'93 See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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importantly, it stamped a giant question mark on the future of IOLTA
programs in the United States. By ruling that the interest income generated
by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the principal
owners, the Court attacked the validity of IOLTA programs, while
simultaneously leaving the ultimate disposition of the IOLTA debate-whether IOLTA programs constitute a Fifth Amendment takings
claim-undecided.
As asserted by the dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer,
it was error for the majority of the Court to abstractly decide this very
important issue. 9 As this Note has outlined, the adjudication of constitutional attacks on IOLTA programs has been ongomg and presumably will
continue until the Supreme Court makes an affirmative ruling as to the
programs' constitutionality. Although, arguably, the Court could not reach
the "taking" or 'just compensation" components of the Takings Clause
195
analysis because of the failure of the Fifth Circuit to rule on those issues,
perhaps Phillipswas not the correct IOLTA case for the Court to hear.'96
Regardless, after the Phillipsdecision the states are left with only a partial
judgment as to the constitutionality oftheir respective IOLTA programs.' 97
The question that must be asked is--"What is next for IOLTA?" To
answer that inquiry one must step back from the limited holding in Phillips
and attempt to ascertain the state of American IOLTA jurisprudence. 9
Based on the previous Takings Clause decisions of the Supreme Court and
the decisions of the First and Eleventh Circuits in their respective IOLTA
cases, the dissenting justices in Phillipswere correct.' Justice Souter was
correct in his assertion that it was error for the majority to "abstractly"
consider only the "property interest" prong of the Takings Clause analysis.
Because the takmgs inquiry is not discreetly confined to its respective
elements, but rather is a determination to be made after considering the
integrated components of the claim, the Court should have remanded
Phillipsfor adjudication ofthe entire case. In doing so, the Court wouldnot
have placed IOLTA programs in the difficult position in which they stand
as a result of the incomplete Phillipsdecision. Furthermore, Justice Breyer
was correct in his assertion that based on the issue as it was currently

94

See discussion supraParts V.B. and V.C.
See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.
196 See id.
'

'95

197 See id.

See id.
See id. at 1934-37 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 1937-39 (Breyer, J.,
'19
dissenting).
198
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before the Court, the interest income generated by IOLTA programs is not
a "property interest" of the principal owners. "°
The Phillips majority erroneously relied on the limited decision of
Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith °1 and the Fifth Circuit's
incorrect interpretation of Texas property law to utilize the "interest
follows principal" rationale. Using this faulty rationale, the Court
concluded that the interest generated through the Texas IOLTA program
20 2
was a "property interest" of the client.
Interest generatedthrough IOLTA programs is not a"property mterest"
of the client. By definition of the IOLTA scheme, client funds placed in
IOLTA accounts could never generate net interest for the principal owner.
It is only through the combination of federal banking statutes authorizing
IOLTA accounts, state IOLTA programs, and Internal Revenue Service
permission that the barren funds of IOLTA claimants produce net
mterest.20 3 Because the client funds deposited in IOLTA programs could
never generate net interest m their individual capacities, the owners may
not claim a "taking." There has been no physical invasion of property, no
net economic impact, nor any interference with reasonable expectations of
investment or gain of net interest. Since the IOLTA claimants could never
have earned net interest in the absence of IOLTA programs, they have lost
no property interest without "just compensation." No compensation is due
when there has been no taking of a property interest. Net interest generated
through IOLTA programs is not a "property mterest" of the individual
client that can be "taken" only with "just compensation." Rather, American
IOLTA programs are a benefit generated through IOLTA's unique
measures for the pro bono and legal aid programs which IOLTA funds
support.2° IOLTA programs, therefore, do not represent a violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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id.at 1937-39 (Breyer, ., dissenting).
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
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See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.
3 See discussion supra Part II.
204 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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